The United States has now formally completed its withdrawal from the World Health Organization, ending nearly eight decades of membership in the UN health agency and reshaping the architecture of global disease surveillance just as governments race to prepare for the next pandemic threat.

While the Trump administration argues that stepping away from WHO will restore national control over health policy, public health leaders around the world warn that the decision could reverberate through future outbreaks, from how quickly new pathogens are detected to how smoothly international travel resumes when crises hit.

More News

A Break With a 78-Year Global Health Partnership

The United States’ exit from WHO on January 22, 2026 followed a yearlong legal process triggered by a January 20, 2025 executive order that revoked a Biden-era decision to remain in the agency. The administration framed the move as a response to what it called profound failures in WHO’s handling of COVID-19, its resistance to reforms and its vulnerability to political pressure from member states. Federal departments halted funding, recalled American staff and ended participation in WHO governing bodies as part of the withdrawal.

For travelers and businesses, this marks a significant shift in the global health landscape. Since WHO’s creation in 1948, the United States has been one of its principal architects, donors and technical contributors, helping to shape everything from vaccination campaigns to rules that govern how countries share information on new health threats. The withdrawal severs that institutional link at a time when international air traffic has returned to pre-pandemic levels and pathogens can move between continents in a matter of hours.

While U.S. officials say they will continue to work on health issues through bilateral deals and private partnerships, the decision removes Washington’s direct voice from the main multilateral forum that coordinates early warnings, risk assessments and guidance during outbreaks. That absence could be felt not only in Geneva conference rooms, but in airports, seaports and border crossings where health rules are implemented day to day.

Funding Shock for WHO and the Systems That Protect Travelers

One of the most immediate consequences of the U.S. withdrawal is financial. Before ties were cut, the United States was WHO’s largest single donor, providing more than 600 million dollars a year in mandatory dues and voluntary contributions. That support underpinned programs for polio eradication, vaccine delivery, emergency response and disease surveillance in low and middle income countries, many of which are critical nodes in the detection of new pathogens that could spread internationally.

Without U.S. government funding, WHO must turn to other member states and philanthropic organizations to plug the gap. European governments, Gulf states and private foundations may step up, but officials and analysts say a shortfall is likely in the near term. That could mean fewer field epidemiologists, less laboratory support and thinner monitoring in regions where emerging diseases often first appear. For travelers, weaker surveillance abroad can translate into slower identification of threats that may already be en route to major hubs in North America, Europe or Asia.

There are also concerns about specific travel-related programs. WHO has long worked with airports, airlines and cruise operators on standards for vaccination certificates, yellow fever risk mapping, ship sanitation and emergency protocols when sick passengers are identified in transit. A funding squeeze may push WHO to scale back some of this technical assistance. While wealthier countries can often fill in with their own experts, smaller states that depend on WHO guidance could struggle, creating gaps in a system that relies on consistent standards across borders.

International Health Regulations Without a Full U.S. Partner

Much of modern global outbreak management is built around the International Health Regulations, a binding framework updated in 2005 after the SARS epidemic. The IHR require countries to build core public health capacities, notify WHO swiftly about events that could constitute a public health emergency of international concern and work together to avoid unnecessary interference with travel and trade when responding to threats. They also set rules around health documentation for travelers and ships, quarantine measures and screening at points of entry.

Although the IHR apply broadly to 196 states parties, including all WHO members, the United States has signaled a more confrontational stance toward recent amendments aimed at strengthening the system in light of COVID-19. In 2025, U.S. officials rejected new provisions that would expand WHO’s role in coordinating responses and encourage the use of interoperable digital health certificates. The administration has framed those measures as intrusions on national sovereignty and personal privacy, even as other governments see them as tools to restore travel faster and more safely during emergencies.

The practical effect is that in the next major outbreak, the frameworks that guide how borders open or close, which tests or vaccines are accepted for entry and how information flows between capitals may become more fragmented. Many countries are likely to lean on WHO and the amended IHR to harmonize their approaches. A United States that is outside WHO and skeptical of new IHR provisions may adopt its own standards and timelines, complicating life for travelers, airlines and tour operators trying to navigate a patchwork of requirements.

Slower Alerts, Uneven Data and the Risk of Missed Signals

Beyond legal obligations, outbreaks are contained or missed based on the speed and transparency of data sharing. Traditionally, U.S. scientists working at or with WHO have played a prominent role in detecting anomalies, analyzing viral genomes and helping other countries interpret early warning signals. With U.S. government staff withdrawn from WHO offices and technical committees, that direct pipeline of expertise is narrowed, even if American universities and nongovernmental organizations remain active.

Specialists warn that the loss of close day to day contact between U.S. agencies and WHO’s emergency teams could slow the flow of information in both directions. During a fast moving respiratory outbreak, even a short delay in recognizing sustained human to human transmission can mean the difference between targeted containment and global spread. Travelers might experience this as a sudden imposition of stringent controls only after a virus has already seeded widely, rather than a more calibrated, earlier response informed by robust data.

There is also the question of how willing other countries will be to share sensitive health information directly with Washington if it is seen as working outside the main multilateral framework. For many low and middle income states, WHO serves as a trusted intermediary that can help validate data, provide technical support and frame messages in ways that minimize economic harm. Without that buffer, some governments may hesitate to report unusual clusters or potential new pathogens early, fearing unilateral travel bans or trade restrictions from powerful countries.

Travel Rules in the Next Pandemic: More Fragmented, More Political

The COVID-19 crisis revealed how quickly governments can impose travel restrictions, quarantine rules and testing requirements with little coordination, even when WHO urges restraint. As the world looks ahead to new influenza strains, novel coronaviruses or entirely different threats, many hoped that reforms to WHO and the IHR would lead to clearer, more predictable rules that balance health protection with the needs of travelers and the tourism industry.

The U.S. withdrawal introduces an additional layer of uncertainty. If the next global health emergency erupts while Washington remains outside WHO, coordination over border measures is likely to be brokered through ad hoc coalitions, regional blocs and bilateral deals rather than a single, widely accepted platform. Airlines could face diverging obligations depending on whether they are flying into jurisdictions aligned with WHO guidance or into the United States and other countries that choose their own path.

For travelers, that scenario could mean dealing with multiple digital health apps, incompatible vaccination certificates and shifting entry rules that differ dramatically from one destination to another. Travel planners and tour operators may find it harder to advise clients, especially when scientific assessments of risk become entangled with geopolitical disputes. Countries that depend heavily on tourism might feel pressure to follow whichever standard keeps their routes open, even if that conflicts with what WHO recommends on purely health grounds.

Can Bilateral Deals and Private Initiatives Fill the Gap?

U.S. officials insist that leaving WHO does not mean stepping back from global health. They have pledged to redirect resources through bilateral partnerships, regional organizations, faith based groups and private foundations. In theory, this could offer more targeted assistance and allow Washington to work closely with trusted partners on disease surveillance, vaccination and emergency response while avoiding what the administration views as bureaucratic inefficiencies at WHO.

In practice, public health experts question whether a web of separate deals can fully replace the convening power and global legitimacy of the UN agency. Much of outbreak management depends not just on money or technical expertise, but on widely shared norms and expectations. When WHO declares a public health emergency of international concern or recommends that countries avoid blanket travel bans, that signal carries political weight even if compliance is imperfect. Similar pronouncements from a single national government, no matter how powerful, are unlikely to be perceived as neutral.

There is also the risk of duplication and gaps. If U.S. funding bypasses WHO and flows directly to selected countries and institutions, some vulnerable regions may be left with fewer resources, creating blind spots in global surveillance. For a traveler, a case of viral hemorrhagic fever missed in a remote border area because local health workers lack support can be just as consequential as a misstep in a major city, given how quickly infections can connect across continents.

Strains on Science Collaboration and Vaccine Equity

During COVID-19, tension between national interests and global solidarity was visible in the race for vaccines, testing supplies and treatments. Early initiatives like COVAX sought to pool resources and distribute vaccines more equitably, while WHO worked to coordinate clinical trials and standardize regulatory criteria. The United States had a complicated relationship with some of those efforts even while still a WHO member, prioritizing domestic procurement before contributing to multilateral schemes.

Outside WHO’s framework, managing similar challenges in future outbreaks could become more fragmented. American agencies, companies and research institutions will still participate in scientific networks, but the absence of U.S. government representation in WHO led platforms may make it harder to reach global consensus on issues such as which vaccine candidates to prioritize, how to share limited supplies, or when it is safe to relax travel restrictions after a new pathogen emerges.

For travelers, those decisions are not abstract. A patchwork of approvals and divergent safety assessments can affect which vaccines are accepted as proof of immunity at international borders. If WHO endorses one set of products while U.S. regulators back another, and if each side is reluctant to recognize the other’s decisions, millions of passengers could find themselves subject to different rules depending on which itinerary they choose. That could complicate long haul tourism, academic exchanges and business travel, particularly for people from countries that rely heavily on WHO prequalification for medicines and vaccines.

Global Health Governance at a Crossroads

The U.S. exit from WHO arrives just as the international community is trying to strengthen global health governance after a pandemic that killed tens of millions of people and disrupted travel and trade on an unprecedented scale. Member states have approved a raft of changes to the International Health Regulations and are negotiating a separate pandemic accord to improve preparedness, surveillance and rapid response. The absence of the United States from these processes raises questions about how cohesive the new system will be and whether parallel structures may emerge.

Some countries may seek to deepen their cooperation with WHO and double down on multilateralism, betting that shared rules remain the best defense against borderless pathogens. Others could be tempted to align with the U.S. approach, emphasizing sovereignty and bespoke arrangements. For industries dependent on the smooth movement of people, goods and services, the path chosen over the next few years will help determine whether the next global health emergency is met with coordinated, science based measures or a scramble of competing rules.

As international travelers return to crowded airports and popular destinations, the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from WHO may not be immediately visible. Flights will still depart, visas will still be issued and tourists will continue to cross borders. But in the background, the mechanisms that detect new threats, decide how to respond and set the conditions for reopening may be more fragile and contested than at any point in recent decades. The true impact of Washington’s departure will likely only become clear when the next major outbreak tests a system now operating with one of its founding members on the outside.